I just finished handling a DDoS incident for a client and made a cup of strong tea. The alarm text message of the server room at 3:00 a.m. is like a death charm, but this time our high defense CDN actually carried the 800Gbps burst traffic, and even the business jitter did not appear. Next door to the old king's home node is still probably rebooting - these days, do not understand the elastic bandwidth and intelligent mobilization of the operation and maintenance, it is simply using a matchstick to support the reservoir gate.<\/p>\n
Burst traffic has long been more than just the patent of the double eleven. I measured the traffic curve of an e-commerce platform on a normal promotional day, within just 5 minutes the number of requests soared 12 times, not to mention those organized CC attacks and pulsed DDoS. traditional fixed-bandwidth CDN is like a single lane in the morning rush hour, no matter what you honk the horn to break and can't move half a step. The real high defense must have \u201cTransformers\u201d type capacity expansion, and elastic bandwidth is its core engine.<\/p>\n
Last year, we helped a financial app to do stress testing stepped on the pit. At that time, we used a vendor who claimed to have \u201cunlimited protection\u201d, and as a result, the sudden traffic just rushed to 200G, and the whole node directly handshake timeout. Later packet capture found that their bandwidth pool is cross-regional scheduling, North American nodes collapsed before borrowing resources from Europe, the delay soared to 900ms +. Blood lessons tell you:Elastic bandwidth must enable hot scaling of resources within a single node<\/strong>Instead of playing the cross-regional trick of tearing down a wall to make up for a wall.<\/p>\n Now the industry can do the real elasticity, counting fingers not more than five. For example, CDN07's dynamic BGP link, I have tested their Tokyo node: in the baseline 100Gbps bandwidth based on 300ms can automatically expand to 1.2Tbps. the key to this expansion is not a simple heap of bandwidth, but based on the type of protocols to do the intelligent allocation - TCP business to the stable link. TCP services are given to stable links, UDP attack traffic is directed to the cleaning center, and HTTP\/HTTPS requests are prioritized to ensure low latency.<\/p>\n Look at this real-time bandwidth sampling data to see where the gap is:<\/p>\n But bandwidth expansion alone is only a half-assed solution. When a video platform was attacked last year, although the bandwidth held up, the DNS resolution was blasted into a sieve. This leads to another core capability:Intelligent dispatch systems must enable millisecond decisions across network links<\/strong>The first thing I'd like to say is that I don't know how to do this. Many vendors boast of \u201cglobal load balancing\u201d is actually still based on the geographic location of the static distribution, encountering unexpected traffic can not be switched.<\/p>\n A good scheduling system has to be like an old driver driving a mountain road - before the eyes see the bend, the hands already start to hit the direction. For example, 08Host's multi-dimensional decision-making model calculates 12 parameters at the same time: real-time link quality, node load cost, attack type characteristics, and even predicts the next AS number that may be congested. Their scheduler enables full network path reconfiguration in 0.3 seconds, more than 20 times faster than traditional DNS scheduling.<\/p>\n Here's a comparison of scheduling latency from my test last month:<\/p>\n Don't trust those vendors who only dump TCP optimization solutions. Once a customer was fooled into buying the \u201cexclusive protocol stack optimization\u201d, the result is that when encountering SYN Flood attack, the number of new connections per second more than 800,000 will directly break the defense. Real high defense must play a combination of punches: elastic bandwidth to protect the capacity, intelligent scheduling to protect the path, protocol optimization to protect the efficiency of the three layers are indispensable.<\/p>\n I found an interesting phenomenon in the actual battle: many attack traffic will now be disguised as normal business. Last week encountered a CC attack on the imitation of the short video API request pattern, 2 million requests per second with a valid authentication token. At this time, pure bandwidth expansion but will help the evil, must rely on behavioral analysis engine in the scheduling layer to intercept. CDN07 solution is to expand the elasticity of the channel mounted AI detection module, expanding bandwidth does not go to the cleaning cluster directly drop packets, which is really reliable.<\/p>\n To give an example configuration, here's our implementation of Elastic Bandwidth + Intelligent Scheduling linked jobs on CDN5:<\/p>\n Finally, a tyrannical theory: those who still dare to use fixed bandwidth packages in 2024 are either tycoons or true warriors. I have handled the investigation of the leakage incident, at least three times because they could not open the elastic bandwidth, the source station IP is exposed after the pulse attack. Now CDN07 and 08Host have a flexible mode of billing by volume, the attack came to expand capacity, usually pay the basic bandwidth fee, the cost can be reduced 60% or more.<\/p>\n Technology is the most afraid of this thing on paper. Last year, a vendor white paper blowing their scheduling algorithms how powerful, the results of a test, node switching to recursively update the entire network DNS cache, the yellow flowers are cold. The real work is ground out in the actual battle - like this early morning 800G attack and defense war, intelligent scheduling system in 18 seconds to cut the user traffic to the three standby nodes, the elastic bandwidth synchronization expansion to 900G, since the beginning of the user even a 502 have not seen.<\/p>\n In the end, high defense CDN is no longer a simple traffic mover. It must be able to predict the attacks of Zhu Geliang, can carry the pressure of the Optimus Prime, it must also be a careful calculation of Mr. Accounts. Those who are still stuck in the \u201cG number war\u201d level of vendors, sooner or later to be pressed on the ground friction.<\/p>\n (Suddenly received a monitoring alarm, looked at the console and laughed again - this time it is a customer activity traffic naturally skyrocketed 320%, the system is automatically expanding capacity. (Touch out the phone to send a message to the technical team: \u201cTonight's afternoon tea on me, by the way, 08Host's hybrid scheduling solution to optimize another version\u201d)<\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" I just finished handling a DDoS incident for a client and made a cup of strong tea. The alarm text message of the server room at 3:00 a.m. is like a death charm, but this time our high defense CDN actually carried the 800Gbps burst traffic, and even the business jitter did not appear. Next door to the old king's self-built node at this moment is estimated to be restarted - these days, do not understand the elastic bandwidth and intelligent mobilization of the operation and maintenance, it is simply a matchstick to support the reservoir gate. Sudden traffic has long been more than just the patent of the double eleven. I measured the traffic curve of an e-commerce platform on an ordinary promotional day, just 5 minutes the number of requests soared 12 times, not to mention those organized CC attacks and pulse DDoS. traditional fixed-bandwidth CDN is like a single lane in the morning rush hour, no matter what you honked the horn to break the move not half a step. The real high defense must have a \u201cTransformers\u201d type of<\/p>","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"gallery","meta":{"_seopress_robots_primary_cat":"","_seopress_titles_title":"","_seopress_titles_desc":"","_seopress_robots_index":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[150],"tags":[],"collection":[],"class_list":["post-1029","post","type-post","status-publish","format-gallery","hentry","category-updates","post_format-post-format-gallery"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.ddosgj.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1029","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.ddosgj.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.ddosgj.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.ddosgj.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.ddosgj.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1029"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/www.ddosgj.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1029\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1096,"href":"https:\/\/www.ddosgj.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1029\/revisions\/1096"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.ddosgj.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1029"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.ddosgj.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1029"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.ddosgj.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1029"},{"taxonomy":"collection","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.ddosgj.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/collection?post=1029"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}